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175 167 acts of the first Ming emperor Hung Wu (Chu Yüan-chang) was to remove most of the population of the Nanking area to Yunnan. Thereafter, armies recruited largely from the Yangtze Valley were settled in agricultural colonies throughout the fertile regions of Szechwan, Kweichow, and Yunnan. Fortifications were established at strategic points in the three provinces. Control and colonization in other areas of the Southwest Region were facilitated by commercial and civilian agencies. These acts made possible the establishment of Kweichow as a province under Chinese administrative control.[15]

175 636 The incorporation of Yunnan, Kweichow, and Szechwan into the Chinese Empire did not mean the imposition of effective control by the central government throughout these provinces. The Han Dynasty policy of indirect administration of non-Han Chinese areas through local rulers was formalized under the Ming Dynasty by the inauguration of the t'u-ssu system. Under it, local rulers were confirmed or established as hereditary t'u-ssu (local agents of the government) with various ranks in tribal areas. About one-third of these local chieftains were natives of the areas they controlled, another third were tribal leaders not native to the locality under their command, and the remaining third were Han Chinese, most of whom had adopted the customs of the subject tribal people.[16]

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15. Wiens, op. cit., pp. 180-85, 192-200.

16. On the inauguration of the t'u-ssu system and the extension of Chinese control in the Southwest Region, see ibid., pp. 221-66.

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636 Some progress in extending direct control over former tribal areas was made by the Ming Dynasty through its program of planned settlement and military action. However, the Ming administration vacillated between a policy of leaving non-Han Chinese areas to their own devices and eliminating t'u-ssu power by military force. The latter policy was most consistently and successfully pursued in Kweichow.

A more persistent attempt to bring the whole Southwest under Chinese administration was pursued by the Ch'ing Dynasty. Under the Republic (1912-1949), the extension of Chinese administration was handicapped by internal revolution, external interference, and warlord rule until the retreat of the Nationalist Government to Chungking in 1938. By the end of the anti-Japanese Resistance War in 1945, some progress in further integrating the Southwest Region into the Chinese political system had been made, but the t'u-ssu and lesser tribal chiefs still exercising real power numbered more than one hundred in Szechwan, more than one hundred and fifty in Yunnan, and over one hundred in Sikang.[17] The continuance since then of local independence in the Southwest is reflected in the announcement that 220 autonomous local governments had been established in the region by the Communist regime up to September 1954.[18]

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563 The extension of central authority in the

17. Ibid., pp. 240-41.
18. People's China, Peking, Sept.1,1954,p.23

175 Southwest was complicated by the lack of respect
~~63~~ toward each other of the Han Chinese and the
563 tribal people. People who refused to adopt the Chinese culture were habitually regarded as inferior by the Chinese. On the other hand, the frontier area did not attract the best officials or Chinese people. Representatives of the central government tended to be second-raters inclined toward indolence, graft, corruption, and oppressive tactics toward the tribal people. Petty artisans and merchants made yearly trips to the frontier areas looking for quick profit by any means, while the more permanent Chinese settlers in the non-Han Chinese areas were often refugees and displaced persons who lived at a lower level than their non-Han Chinese neighbors. From the tribesmen, who respected strength and straightforwardness, such official and non-official representatives of the Chinese earned only contempt and resentment.[19]

Another factor which made the abolition of local autonomy difficult was that the t'u-ssu and lesser chieftains often had the respect of their subjects, entrenched position, and the armed strength to resist anything but a full-scale invasion by the central authority. In many places where hsien government was established by the Ch'ing or Republican central authorities, real power remained in the hands of the t'u-ssu or village headmen.[20]

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19. Wiens, op. cit., pp. 251-53.
20. Ibid., pp. 248-50.

B. The Western Military and Missionary Impact

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The initial effect in the Southwest Region of Western intrusion was the new influence brought to bear on the relation between the tribesmen and Han Chinese authorities by French penetration of Indo-China and British operations in Burma and Tibet. Annam, Tongkin, and Burma were all tributary kingdoms of the Chinese Empire until the last decades of the nineteenth century. Until the coming of the West, their borders with Yunnan were of little consequence to either kingdoms or the empire. The frontier area was rugged terrain inhabited by semi-independent tribes that had no consciousness of political demarcations and that moved freely back and forth across the vague boundary line. With French penetration of Annam and Tongkin and English advances into Upper Burma in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, all these tributary states were wrested away from Chinese suzerainty by force. Their borders and the loyalty of the tribal inhabitants of the frontier region then became matters of prime importance. If China pressed too hard for control or discipline of the tribes commissioned to guard the frontier, they had an alternative to Chinese rule and the means to blackmail the central authorities into more conciliatory treatment.

The Chinese frustration on the frontier was compounded by the inroads of France and England into the Southwestern provinces. Both Western powers in consolidating their position in the former Chinese tributary kingdoms

195 simultaneously enforced demands for the rights
• 636 of trade, mining development, railroad building,
563 and missionary settlement in Yunnan, Szechwan, and Kweichow. The foreign economic and missionary representatives were a constant source of irritation and fear for the Chinese and tribal inhabitants. Their periodic outbreaks of violence against the Westerners constituted excuses for forcing concessions from the Chinese government, causing it real fear that the provinces might eventually be alienated from its control.

By the twentieth century, Britain in Burma was emulating the old Chinese frontier policy of indirect control over the tribal elements. In controlling upper Burma as a defensive outpost of the English colonial empire in India, England left the t'u-ssu intact, subsidized them, and enlisted their sympathy in every way possible. What could happen when the Chinese government failed to follow a similar program was made evident in 1910. An attempt in that year by the Ch'ing Dynasty bureaucracy in Yunnan to punish the tyranny of a t'u-ssu of the P'ien-ma area led to his defection to the British and their occupation of the northwestern corner of the province.[24]

The Chinese have never been reconciled to the loss, and both the Nationalist Government and the Communist regime claim the upper salient

24. Wiens, op. cit., pp. 254-57.

175 of Burma as Chinese territory. Until the out-
635 break of the war of resistance against Japan
563 in 1937, the British t'u-ssu policy in the Burma border area precluded any concerted attempt by the Nationalist Government to exercise real control over the Southwest Region frontier. The same frustration in frontier policy and extension of Chinese authority there still faces the Communist regime, as it has not attempted to enforce by arms its claim to the disputed Burmese area.

175 A chain of circumstances leading to the
635 establishment of Sikang as a separate province
563 within the Chinese administrative system was
669 initiated by the British invasion of Tibet in 1904. The British move was undertaken to offset Russian [illegible] into Tibet during the previous decade, which England believed constituted a threat to its position in India. British occupation was soon followed by direct diplomatic negotiations with Tibet, though China was still recognized as nominal sovereign in the kingdom. At this sign of weakness on the part of the Ch'ing Dynasty, tribal leaders in what was then western Szechwan, and later became eastern Sikang, attempted to revolt. The uprising was quickly put down by a Szechwan army under the command of Chao Erh-feng. He attempted to replace the old t'u-ssu system by instituting hsien government on the Chinese model as a preliminary step to the establishment of a new province to be formed from western Szechwan and eastern Tibet.[25]

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25. Ibid., pp. 237-38.

regime formally established in Peking.[39] It was November before the Second Field Army under Liu Po-ch'eng launched an attack on Kweichow, taking the provincial capital at Kweiyang on November 15. Chungking in Szechwan fell to the Second Field Army on the last day of the month. During the next few weeks, Liu's forces moved westward toward Chengtu while the Fourth Field Army struck into Szechwan from the north. After Chengtu fell December 27, many of the remaining organized Kuomintang forces surrendered to the Communists in Yunnan and Sikang, and the Communists officially claimed the complete "liberation" of the Southwest Region. However, it is clear that large-scale unorganized resistance continued for a good part of 1950, and isolated bands undoubtedly held out much longer in the rugged mountain areas of the Southwest. It is doubtful, too, whether the Communists have any more real control than had former regimes over the semi-independent tribal areas of the Southwest, especially along its borders with Indo-China and Burma.

The lack of any prolonged organized resistance in the naturally defensible areas of the Southwest Region was the result of several factors. Little faith in the Kuomintang cause remained

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39. The names, dates, and campaigns connected with the Communist victory are largely taken from a Communist source, which is accurate in regard to these facts as far as can be determined by checking against other scattered sources: Liao Kai-lung, From Yenan to Peking, Foreign Languages Press, 1954, pp. 108-09.

178 Another problem was the number of steel
499 plants and textile mills which had been estab-
653 lished in the Southwest during war against Japan. The years of civil war in 1949 and 1950 had produced a depression, and industry and commerce could no longer maintain themselves. As a remedy the Communists proposed the construction of the Chungking-Chengtu Railroad. In spite of the great financial difficulties in which the Communist central government was involved at that time, it was decided to invest an amount of money equivalent to 76,000,000 catties of rice for highway construction and 180,000,000 catties for railroad construction. These projects stimulated the revival of the steel, coal, and electrical engineering industries and the economic condition of Szechwan gradually improved.

563 A further problem special to this region was
162 that of the national minorities which amounted, according to the latest census and the report of Wang Wei-chou, to about 12 million

Tibetans	2,775,627
Yi People	3,254,269
Miao People	2,511,339
Chung-chia	1,600,000
Mohammedans	1,000,000
Min-chia	600,000
Thai People	400,000
Total	12,341,235

•636 In order to meet the demands of these minorities,
563 autonomous areas were established. The Tibetans in Sikang constitute a special area, even though

563 the latter is now a part of the province of Szechwan.
636 Below the provincial level, there are 21 autonomous
631 counties, 15 autonomous sections below the county
563 level and 49 autonomous hsiang. In addition, 11 administrative district, 53 county, 27 section, and 72 hsiang coalition governments representing different nationalities have been formed.[7] The Communist Regime attached special importance to winning over the national minorities in order to counteract Kuomintang efforts at infiltration.

635 For a short period the Chinese Communists tried a system of Regional Governments called "The Military and Political Committees of the Greater Areas" for the regions of China proper; and in Manchuria "The People's Government of the Northeast." The Regional Governments were patterned after the Union Republics of the USSR. However, after a two-year period of experiment they were found unsatisfactory and condemned by Liu Shao-ch'i as "Independent Kingdoms." Chou En-lai's Government Administration Council then passed a resolution in November 1952 that the Committee of the region should change its name from the Military and Political Committee to the Administrative Committee, with the status of an agent of the Central Government. After the nature and function of the Administrative Committee was changed into that of an agent of the Central Government, the members of the same committee were no more appointed by the Central People's Government, that is, Mao Tse-tung's Council, but were recommended by the Government Administration Council -- Chou En-lai. Though the Political-Legal Commission, Financial-Economical Com-

[7. on following page]

twelve "Panna," with some differences from the smaller t'u-ssu domains mentioned on the previous page. Only four are found in both lists, Liu-shun, Meng-lung, Meng-che, and Meng-a. The Sip Song Panna was to have formed part of the buffer state proposed in discussions by the French and British in 1895 but this was found impracticable, so that the last hope of an independent T'ai state here failed to materialize.[76]

Of the twelve subordinate states listed by Carey, Wu-tei and Meng-wu were annexed to French Indo-China. The chief towns of these two were Muang-u-nua and Muang-u-tai respectively, situated on the Nam U, a river which joins the Mekong just above Luang Prabang. Said Carey, in 1899, "The history of the 'Sip Song Panna' seems to have been a series of disputes about the succession; and desultory fighting for the supremacy was kept up for years, and until quite recently, between rival chieftains."[77]

Photo 14. Ching-kang, Yun-nan Province (21°46' N, 100° 14' E)

In this view are seen the mountain lands and basins of the southwestern Yun-nan frontier adjacent to Burma. The northward-looking view is from approximately above Ching-kang village, with the elongated river basins of Fu-hai (Meng-hai) in the middle distance. This area constitutes part of the recently established T'ai Autonomous Region organized by the Chinese Communists. Fu-hai has been a Han-Chinese administrative seat in southwest Yun-nan for about two decades and together with Ch'e-li formed the southernmost Chinese district seats in Yun-nan. The river basin is well settled by the wet-rice farming T'ai tribes, while slope farming mountain tribesmen, whose farms are seen in the white patches in the foreground, periodically shift their fields in a migratory system of agriculture, burning forests and brush for new fields as old farms become exhausted. Several states in the cycle of cultivation and abandonment are visible in this photo. It was into the Burmese Shan areas west of this region that the last remnants of the Nationalist armies under General Li Mi fled when the Communists overran China in 1949. Pocketed in such terrain as seen here, aided by local tribesmen, this force successfully withstood Burmese attacks for several years.